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作者：Williams, Basil
作者单位：New York University
摘要：A large literature has shown that asset quality may be signaled by retention or, in a separate literature, screened by liquidity. I present a general framework to analyze both instruments, offering conditions that characterize which instrument will be used in equilibrium. I then expand the private information to include not only asset quality but also seller patience, showing that both retention and liquidity may be used to fully separate both dimensions of private information. The expanded mo...
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作者：Lemus, Jorge; Marshall, Guillermo
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of British Columbia
摘要：Online contests have become a prominent form of innovation procurement. Contest platforms often display a real-time public leaderboard to provide performance feedback. The impact of information disclosure on players' decisions is theoretically ambiguous: some players may get discouraged and quit, while others may decide to keep working to remain competitive. We investigate the impact of a leaderboard on contest outcomes using two complementary approaches. First, we estimate a dynamic model usi...
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作者：Dustmann, Christian; Landerso, Rasmus
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：Men who father their first child at a very young age are convicted of significantly fewer crimes in the first years after birth if the child is a son rather than a daughter. This leads to behavioral spillovers that reduce criminal convictions among other young men living in the same neighborhood, with the resulting crime multipliers affecting peers' crime even after the primary impact on the focal individual has dissipated. Through social multipliers, prevention policies that target potential ...
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作者：Giannetti, Mariassunta; Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas; Tarantino, Emanuele
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute; Bocconi University; Luiss Guido Carli University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We conjecture that suppliers offer trade credit to ease competition in downstream markets. We show theoretically that suppliers that have to transfer surplus to high-bargaining-power customers would want to offer an increasing price schedule to preserve sales to other buyers. Suppliers can implement this using trade credit. Empirically, we find that suppliers grant trade credit to high-bargaining-power customers when they fear the cannibalization of sales to other customers. Exploiting a law t...
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作者：Basker, Emek; Simcoe, Timothy
作者单位：Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the adoption, diffusion, and impacts of the Universal Product Code (UPC) between 1975 and 1992, during the initial years of the bar code system. We find evidence of network effects in the diffusion process. Matched-sample difference-in-differences estimates show that firm size and trademark registrations increase following UPC adoption by manufacturers. Industry-level import penetration also increases with domestic UPC adoption. Our findings suggest that bar codes, scanning, and relat...
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作者：Caplin, Andrew; Martin, Daniel
作者单位：New York University; Northwestern University
摘要：We take the perspective of an econometrician who wants to determine which of two experiments provides higher expected utility but only knows the decisions under each experiment. To compare these decisions, the econometrician must make inferences about what the experiment might have been for each set of decisions. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition that identifies when every experiment consistent with one set of decisions has a higher value of information than every experiment cons...
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作者：Huber, Kilian; Lindenthal, Volker; Waldinger, Fabian
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Munich
摘要：Large-scale increases in discrimination can lead to dismissals of highly qualified managers. We investigate how expulsions of senior Jewish managers, due to rising discrimination in Nazi Germany, affected large corporations. Firms that lost Jewish managers experienced persistent reductions in stock prices, dividends, and returns on assets. Aggregate market value fell by roughly 1.8% of German GNP because of the expulsions. Managers who served as key connectors to other firms and managers who w...
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作者：Chernozhukov, Victor; Galichon, Alfred; Henry, Marc; Pass, Brendan
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); New York University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Alberta
摘要：This paper derives conditions under which preferences and technology are nonparametrically identified in hedonic equilibrium models. With products differentiated along a quality index and agents characterized by scalar unobserved heterogeneity, single-crossing conditions on preferences and technology provide identifying restrictions in previous work. We develop similar shape restrictions in the multiattribute case. These shape restrictions, based on optimal transport theory and generalized con...
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作者：Conlon, Christopher T.; Mortimer, Julie Holland
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
摘要：In many industries, upstream manufacturers pay downstream retailers for achieving quantity or market share targets. These vertical rebates may mitigate downstream moral hazard by inducing greater retail effort but may also incentivize retailers to drop competing products. We study these offsetting effects empirically for a rebate paid to one retailer. Using a field experiment, we exogenously vary the outcome of retailer effort. We estimate models of consumer choice and retailer behavior to qua...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Sandomirskiy, Fedor; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. For two agents, we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann's agreement theorem and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions from a 1995 work by Dawid and colleagues. For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a no-trade condition. We use these ch...
