Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Sandomirskiy, Fedor; Tamuz, Omer
• 署名单位: Technion Israel Institute of Technology; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/714993
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2546-2594
• 关键词: PROBABILITY-MEASURES; common priors; INFORMATION; EXISTENCE; TRADE

摘要

We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. For two agents, we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann's agreement theorem and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions from a 1995 work by Dawid and colleagues. For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a no-trade condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.