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作者：Geruso, Michael; Layton, Timothy
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Harvard Medical School
摘要：In most US health insurance markets, plans face strong incentives to upcode the patient diagnoses they report to the regulator, as these affect the risk-adjusted payments that plans receive. We show that enrollees in private Medicare plans generate 6%-16% higher diagnosis-based risk scores than they would under fee-for-service Medicare, where diagnoses do not affect most provider payments. Our estimates imply that upcoding generates billions in excess public spending and significant distortion...
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作者：Benzarti, Youssef; Carloni, Dorian; Harju, Jarkko; Kosonen, Tuomas
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; National Bureau of Economic Research; Congressional Budget Office; VATT Institute for Economic Research
摘要：This paper provides evidence that prices respond significantly more strongly to increases than to decreases in value-added taxes (VATs). First, using two plausibly exogenous VAT changes, we show that prices respond twice as much to VAT increases as to VAT decreases. Second, we show that this asymmetry results in higher equilibrium profits and markups. Third, we find that firms operating with low profit margins are particularly likely to respond asymmetrically to VAT changes. Fourth, these asym...
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作者：Pastor, Lubos; Veronesi, Pietro
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; National Bank of Slovakia; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We develop a model of political cycles driven by time-varying risk aversion. Agents choose to work in the public or private sector and to vote Democratic or Republican. In equilibrium, when risk aversion is high, agents elect Democrats-the party promising more redistribution. The model predicts higher average stock market returns under Democratic presidencies, explaining the well-known presidential puzzle. The model can also explain why economic growth has been faster under Democratic presiden...
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作者：Hansman, Christopher; Hjort, Jonas; Leon-Ciliotta, Gianmarco; Teachout, Matthieu
作者单位：Imperial College London; Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We study the relationship between firms' output quality and organizational structure. Using data on the production and transaction chain that makes up Peruvian fish meal manufacturing, we establish three results. First, firms integrate suppliers when the quality premium rises for exogenous reasons. Second, suppliers change their behavior to better maintain input quality when vertically integrated. Third, firms produce a higher share of high-quality output when weather and supplier availability...
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作者：Chari, V. V.; Dovis, Alessandro; Kehoe, Patrick J.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University; University of London; University College London
摘要：When is financial repression-namely, policies that force banks to hold government debt-optimal? With commitment, such policies are never optimal because they crowd out banks' productive investments. Without commitment, they are optimal when governments need to issue unusually large amounts of debt, such as during wartime. In such times, repression allows governments to credibly issue more debt. Repression increases credibility because when banks hold government debt, defaults dilute net worth,...
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作者：Caliendo, Lorenzo; Mion, Giordano; Opromolla, Luca David; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban
作者单位：Yale University; University of Sussex; Banco de Portugal; Princeton University
摘要：Using employer-employee matched and firm production quantity and input data for Portuguese firms, we study the endogenous response of productivity to firm reorganizations as measured by changes in the number of management layers. We show that, as a result of an exogenous demand or productivity shock that makes the firm reorganize and add a management layer, quantity-based productivity increases by about 6%, while revenue-based productivity drops by around 3%. Such a reorganization makes the fi...
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作者：Boppart, Timo; Krusell, Per
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Gothenburg; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The absence of a trend in hours worked in the postwar United States is an exception: across countries and historically, hours fall steadily by a little below 0.5% per year. Are steadily falling hours consistent with a stable utility function over consumption and leisure under balanced growth of the macroeconomic aggregates? Yes. We fully characterize the class of such functions and thus generalize the well-known balanced-growth preferences that demand constant (as opposed to falling) long-run ...
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作者：Eden, Maya
作者单位：Brandeis University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：How much should society be willing to pay for reducing inequality? The standard approach to this normative question relates inequality aversion to risk aversion by treating inequality as an outcome of a lottery. However, in the presence of heterogeneous risk preferences, it is unclear whose preferences should be used for evaluating this lottery. This paper derives a social welfare function as a limit of an iterative procedure, in which each iteration constructs a lottery based on the certainty...
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作者：Chen, Yan; Kesten, Onur
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; University of Sydney
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作者：Cattaneo, Matias D.; Ma, Xinwei; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Suleymanov, Elchin
作者单位：Princeton University; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This paper illustrates how one can deduce preference from observed choices when attention is both limited and random. We introduce a random attention model where we abstain from any particular attention formation and instead consider a large class of nonparametric random attention rules. Our intuitive condition, monotonic attention, captures the idea that each consideration set competes for the decision maker's attention. We then develop a revealed preference theory and obtain testable implica...
