Efficiency and Foreclosure Effects of Vertical Rebates: Empirical Evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Conlon, Christopher T.; Mortimer, Julie Holland
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/716563
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 3357-3404
• 关键词: inventories; price

摘要

In many industries, upstream manufacturers pay downstream retailers for achieving quantity or market share targets. These vertical rebates may mitigate downstream moral hazard by inducing greater retail effort but may also incentivize retailers to drop competing products. We study these offsetting effects empirically for a rebate paid to one retailer. Using a field experiment, we exogenously vary the outcome of retailer effort. We estimate models of consumer choice and retailer behavior to quantify the rebate's effect on retail assortment and effort. We find that the rebate is designed to exclude a competing product and fails to maximize social surplus.