Dynamic Tournament Design: Evidence from Prediction Contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lemus, Jorge; Marshall, Guillermo
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/711762
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 383-420
• 关键词: rank-order tournaments; Optimal allocation; performance feedback; CHOICE-PROBABILITIES; innovation contests; prizes; LEADERBOARDS; procurement; COMPETITION; auction

摘要

Online contests have become a prominent form of innovation procurement. Contest platforms often display a real-time public leaderboard to provide performance feedback. The impact of information disclosure on players' decisions is theoretically ambiguous: some players may get discouraged and quit, while others may decide to keep working to remain competitive. We investigate the impact of a leaderboard on contest outcomes using two complementary approaches. First, we estimate a dynamic model using observational data and compare the equilibria with and without a leaderboard. Second, we present experimental evidence from student competitions. We find that a leaderboard on average improves competition outcomes.