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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kandori, Michihiro
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper proposes a class of games calledrevision games. In a revision game, players start with initially prepared actions, followed by a sequence of random revision opportunities until a predetermined deadline. In the course of revisions, players monitor each other's behavior. It is shown that players can cooperate and that their behavior under the optimal equilibrium is described by a simple differential equation. We present the necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation to be sus...
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作者：Sentana, Enrique
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作者：Brooks, Wyatt; Donovan, Kevin
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Yale University
摘要：We measure the impact of increasing integration between rural villages and outside labor markets. Seasonal flash floods cause exogenous and unpredictable loss of market access. We study the impact of new bridges that eliminate this risk. Identification exploits variation in riverbank characteristics that preclude bridge construction in some villages, despite similar need. We collect detailed annual household surveys over three years, and weekly telephone followups to study contemporaneous effe...
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作者：Burstein, Ariel; Hanson, Gordon; Tian Lin; Vogel, Jonathan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Harvard University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：In this paper, we study how occupation (or industry) tradability shapes local labor-market adjustment to immigration. Theoretically, we derive a simple condition under which the arrival of foreign-born labor into a region crowds native-born workers out of (or into) immigrant-intensive jobs, thus lowering (or raising) relative wages in these occupations, and we explain why this process differs within tradable versus within nontradable activities. Using data for U.S. commuting zones over the per...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non-uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record-keeping or communication devices-including cheap talk communication and public randomization-are necessary.
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作者：Trevino, Isabel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Two main classes of channels are studied as informational sources of financial contagion. One is a fundamental channel that is based on real and financial links between economies, and the second is a social learning channel that arises when agents base their decisions on noisy observations about the actions of others in foreign markets. Using global games, I present a two-country model of financial contagion in which both channels can operate and I test its predictions experimentally. The expe...
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作者：Beraja, Martin; Hurst, Erik; Ospina, Juan
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago; Banco de la Republica Colombia
摘要：Making inferences about aggregate business cycles from regional variation alone is difficult because of economic channels and shocks that differ between regional and aggregate economies. However, we argue that regional business cycles contain valuable information that can help discipline models of aggregate fluctuations. We begin by documenting a strong relationship across U.S. states between local employment and wage growth during the Great Recession. This relationship is much weaker in U.S. ...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Hellman, Ziv; Levy, Yehuda John
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of Glasgow
摘要：A general selection theorem is presented constructing a measurable mapping from a state space to a parameter space under the assumption that the state space can be decomposed as a collection of countable equivalence classes under a smooth equivalence relation. It is then shown how this selection theorem can be used as a general purpose tool for proving the existence of measurable equilibria in broad classes of several branches of games when an appropriate smoothness condition holds, including ...
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作者：Sentana, Enrique
