The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Deb, Joyee; Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
• 署名单位: Yale University; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA16680
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 917-964
• 关键词: social norms; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; COMMUNICATION; COOPERATION; equilibria; EVOLUTION; payoffs; money

摘要

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non-uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record-keeping or communication devices-including cheap talk communication and public randomization-are necessary.