Revision Games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kamada, Yuichiro; Kandori, Michihiro
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Tokyo
刊物名称：
ECONOMETRICA
ISSN/ISSBN：
0012-9682
DOI：
10.3982/ECTA15272
发表日期：
2020
页码：
1599-1630
关键词：
摘要：
This paper proposes a class of games calledrevision games. In a revision game, players start with initially prepared actions, followed by a sequence of random revision opportunities until a predetermined deadline. In the course of revisions, players monitor each other's behavior. It is shown that players can cooperate and that their behavior under the optimal equilibrium is described by a simple differential equation. We present the necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation to be sustained in revision games. We also present applications to the preopening activities in the stock exchange and to an electoral campaign.