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作者：Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper shows that bargainers may reach delayed agreements even in environments where there is no uncertainty about payoffs or feasible actions. Under such conditions, delay may arise when bargainers face direct forms of strategic uncertainty-that is, uncertainty about the opponent's play. The paper restricts the nature of this uncertainty in two important ways. First, it assumes on-path strategic certainty: Bargainers face uncertainty only after surprise moves. Second, it assumes Battigall...
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作者：Rosenberg, Dinah; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We revisit prominent learning models in which a sequence of agents make a binary decision on the basis of both a private signal and information related to past choices. We analyze the efficiency of learning in these models, measured in terms of the expected welfare. We show that, irrespective of the distribution of private signals, learning efficiency is the same whether each agent observes the entire sequence of earlier decisions or only the previous decision. In addition, we provide a simple...
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作者：Aguiar, Mark; Amador, Manuel; Hopenhayn, Hugo; Werning, Ivan
作者单位：Princeton University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the interactions between sovereign debt default and maturity choice in a setting with limited commitment for repayment as well as future debt issuances. Our main finding is that, under a wide range of conditions, the sovereign should, as long as default is not preferable, remain passive in long-term bond markets, making payments and retiring long-term bonds as they mature but never actively issuing or buying back such bonds. The only active debt-management margin is the short-term bon...
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作者：Fu, Chao; Gregory, Jesse
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the optimal design of subsidies in an equilibrium setting, where the decisions of individual recipients impose externalities on one another. We apply the model to the case of post-Katrina rebuilding in New Orleans under the Louisiana Road Home rebuilding grant program (RH). We estimate the structural model via indirect inference, exploiting a discontinuity in the formula for determining the size of grants, which helps isolate the causal effect of neighbors' rebuilding on one's own reb...
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作者：Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：A sender persuades a receiver to accept a project by disclosing information about a payoff-relevant quality. The receiver has private information about the quality, referred to as his type. We show that the sender-optimal mechanism takes the form of nested intervals: each type accepts on an interval of qualities and a more optimistic type's interval contains a less optimistic type's interval. This nested-interval structure offers a simple algorithm to solve for the optimal disclosure and conne...
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作者：Gourieroux, C.; Monfort, A.; Zakoian, J. -M.
作者单位：University of Toronto; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Universite de Lille
摘要：In a transformation model yt=c[a(xt,beta),ut], where the errors ut are i.i.d. and independent of the explanatory variables xt, the parameters can be estimated by a pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) method, that is, by using a misspecified distribution of the errors, but the PML estimator of beta is in general not consistent. We explain in this paper how to nest the initial model in an identified augmented model with more parameters in order to derive consistent PML estimators of appropriate func...
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作者：de Castro, Luciano; Galvao, Antonio F.
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Arizona
摘要：This paper develops a dynamic model of rational behavior under uncertainty, in which the agent maximizes the stream of future tau-quantile utilities, for tau is an element of (0,1). That is, the agent has a quantile utility preference instead of the standard expected utility. Quantile preferences have useful advantages, including the ability to capture heterogeneity and allowing the separation between risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Although quantiles do not share s...
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作者：Hara, Kazuhiro; Ok, Efe A.; Riella, Gil
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation; New York University; New York University; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：This paper begins by observing that any reflexive binary (preference) relation (over risky prospects) that satisfies the independence axiom admits a form of expected utility representation. We refer to this representation notion as the coalitional minmax expected utility representation. By adding the remaining properties of the expected utility theorem, namely, continuity, completeness, and transitivity, one by one, we find how this representation gets sharper and sharper, thereby deducing the...
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作者：Sentana, Enrique
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作者：Carroll, Gabriel; Egorov, Georgy
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A receiver wants to learn multidimensional information from a sender, and she has the capacity to verify just one dimension. The sender's payoff depends on the belief he induces, via an exogenously given monotone function. We show that by using a randomized verification strategy, the receiver can learn the sender's information fully in many cases. We characterize exactly when it is possible to do so. In particular, when the exogenous payoff function is submodular, we can explicitly describe a ...
