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作者：Bizzotto, Jacopo; Hinnosaar, Toomas; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); University of Nottingham
摘要：We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. Under general commitment structures, the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her lowest Cournot payoff. We apply our results to...
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作者：Catonini, Emiliano; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：New York University; NYU Shanghai; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Backward induction (BI) is only defined for perfect information games, but its logic is also invoked in many concepts for imperfect or incomplete information games. Yet, the meaning of BI reasoning is not clear in these settings, and we lack a way to capture the essence of BI without assuming equilibrium. We introduce backward rationalizability, a nonequilibrium solution concept for incomplete information games, which we argue distills the logic of BI reasoning. We show several of its properti...
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作者：Dworczak, Piotr
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I study a simple equity-efficiency problem: A designer allocates a fixed amount of money to a population of agents differing in privately observed marginal values for money. She can only screen by imposing an ordeal-that is, by allocating more money to agents who engage in a socially wasteful activity (such as queuing or filling out forms). Giving a lump-sum transfer is outperformed by an ordeal mechanism when agents with the lowest money-denominated cost of engaging in the wasteful activity h...
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作者：Myatt, David P.; Ronayne, David
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：We generalize the captive-and-shopper model of sales to allow asymmetries in production costs and captive audiences, in oligopoly. Both kinds of asymmetry determine the firms that compete (via randomized sales) to serve the price-comparing shoppers, while other firms exploit their captive audiences. In contrast to a model with symmetric costs (but asymmetric captive audiences), there are natural situations in which more than two firms use sales by engaging in pairwise battles across distinct p...
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作者：Alaoui, Larbi; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Individuals often attach a special meaning to attaining a certain goal, and getting past a threshold marks the difference between success and failure. In this paper, we take a standard expected utility (EU) setting with an exogenous reference point that separates success from failure and define attitudes toward success and failure as features of preferences over lotteries. The distinctive feature of our definitions is that they concern a local reversal of the decision-maker's risk attitude acr...
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作者：Alon, Shiri; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Durham University; Bar Ilan University
摘要：We provide axioms that relate the preferences of each group in a society to the preferences of the subgroups contained in them. These axioms yield cardinal utility indices for each individual and a representation of group preferences as the group-dependent weighted sum of the utility indices of the members of that group. We show that these weights are group independent whenever one additional axiom and a mild linear independence assumption are satisfied.
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作者：Jackson, Matthew O.; Storms, Evan C.
作者单位：Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：When people coordinate their behaviors with their friends-e.g., choosing whether to adopt a new technology, protest against a government, attend university-divisions within a social network can lead to contrasting norms of behavior in different parts of the network. We define a society's atoms to be groups of people who adopt the same behavior in every equilibrium. We show that the atoms are at least as coarse as blocks in stochastic block models, and that using knowledge of the atoms to seed ...
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作者：Cao, Dan; Lagunoff, Roger; Xu, Yingqi
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：We examine the dynamic connections between local wealth inequality and the local politics of property rights. A jurisdiction comprises a politically dominant in-group and a marginalized out-group. At each date, the jurisdiction exploits weaknesses in due process rights under the legal system to redistribute property claims away from the out-group and toward the in-group. It combines takings and zoning with the leveraging of public assets to deter legal challenges. This leverage varies over tim...
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作者：Sullivan, Michael Rolland
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：This article develops techniques for the empirical analysis of repeated sequential search over unordered alternatives using data on consumer search processes. I use these techniques to assess why consumers conduct little search in e-commerce and often pay significantly above the minimum available price for a product. Search costs could explain these facts, as could pre-search seller differentiation: Consumers with low search costs may not visit stores they dislike based on information known be...
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作者：Krasikov, Ilia; Lamba, Rohit
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Cornell University
摘要：This paper builds a theory of dynamic pricing for the sale of timed goods. The main friction is private and evolving valuation of the buyer prior to the date of consumption, which follows a Poisson process. A combination of membership fees and continuously increasing prices induces a threshold response from the buyer, endogenously segmenting the market along timing of purchase. This pricing mechanism achieves the deterministic global optimum. The tools developed here are shown to be useful in ...
