-
作者：Benabou, Roland; Vellodi, Nikhil
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study a sequential experimentation model with endogenous feedback. Agents choose between a safe and risky action, the latter generating stochastic rewards. When making this choice, each agent is selfishly motivated (myopic). However, agents can disclose their experiences to a public record, and when doing so are prosocially motivated (forward-looking). Disclosure is both polarized (only extreme signals are disclosed) and positively biased (no feedback is bad news). The extent of disclosure ...
-
作者：Hua, Xinyu; Spier, Kathryn E.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Should platforms be liable for harms suffered by users? A platform enables interactions between firms and users. Harmful firms impose larger costs on users than safe firms. If firms have deep pockets and are fully liable for harms, platform liability is unnecessary. If firms have limited liability, holding platforms liable for residual harm increases platforms' incentives to raise interaction prices and invest in auditing to deter, detect, and block harmful firms. The social desirability and o...
-
作者：Newham, Melissa; Seldeslachts, Jo; Banal-Estanol, Albert
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; KU Leuven; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University of Amsterdam; Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; City St Georges, University of London
摘要：Common ownership-where several firms are (partially) owned by the same investors-and its impact on product market competition has recently drawn much attention. This paper focuses on its implications for market entry. We consider the entry decisions of generic pharmaceutical firms into drug markets that are opened up by the end of regulatory protection and which were previously dominated by a single firm selling the brand name drug. We find robust evidence that an increase in common ownership ...
-
作者：Wilson, Kyle
作者单位：Pomona College; Claremont Colleges; Pomona College
摘要：Government infrastructure investment may crowd out investment from private firms or induce them to invest preemptively. The tension between these effects underlies the policy debate over municipal provision of internet access. I estimate demand for broadband and combine these results with a dynamic oligopoly model of private and public firms' entry and investment decisions. I simulate a ban on public entry and find that municipalities crowd out more private fiber-optic investment than they ind...
-
作者：Terstiege, Stefan; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Nottingham
摘要：A monopolistic seller possesses an inventory containing distinct products, each consumer wishes to buy a single product, and the seller can steer consumers' choices. We fully characterize the producer-consumer surplus pairs induced by market segmentation when the number of products is large. The same characterization holds if the seller cannot price discriminate. We also investigate the relationship between consumer surplus, social welfare, and consumer privacy. Along the Pareto frontier, poin...
-
作者：Chen, Chia-Hui; Chen, Kong-Pin; Ishida, Junichiro
作者单位：Kyoto University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan; University of Osaka
摘要：Rating systems, widely used in online transactions, often reduce buyers' diverse opinions to summary statistics. To explore the consequences of this coarse aggregation, we analyze a dynamic adverse selection model where buyers share anonymous evaluations via a rating system. With heterogeneous buyers, the seller is tempted to secretly lower prices to attract favorable ratings from price-sensitive buyers. That leads to sporadic flash sales. The seller's incentive to manipulate ratings is, howev...
-
作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the role of information in Bertrand competition with differentiated goods and heterogeneous production costs. When producers know their costs and consumers know their values, consumer surplus and total surplus are aligned, in the sense that the information and equilibrium that maximize consumer surplus also maximize total surplus. Alignment may fail if consumers do not know their values: Partial information about values makes purchases less efficient but intensifies price competition....
-
作者：Arigapudi, Srinivas; Heller, Yuval; Schreiber, Amnon
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Bar Ilan University
摘要：Coordination games feature two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. We investigate learning dynamics where agents observe the actions of a random sample of their opponents. First, we show that when all agents have the same sample size, whether it is small or large, their behavior converges to one of the pure coordinated equilibria. By contrast, our main results show ...
-
作者：Shirakawa, Ryo
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Market design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting. In the context of school choice, this paper proposes that mechanisms ought to be immune only to certain simple misreports. While no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto improves on the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, we find one under our weaker requirement: Kesten's (2010...
-
作者：Horn, Samantha; Loewenstein, George
作者单位：University of Chicago; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Many economic decisions, such as whether to invest in developing new skills, change professions, or purchase a technology, benefit from accurate estimation of skill acquisition. We examine the accuracy of such predictions by having study participants predict the speed at which they will master unfamiliar tasks. Across three studies involving two types of tasks and two levels of difficulty, we find systematic underestimation of learning, even after receiving feedback. In a fourth study, partici...
