Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arigapudi, Srinivas; Heller, Yuval; Schreiber, Amnon
• 署名单位: Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240109
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: STATISTICAL-INFERENCE; stationary concepts; games; equilibrium; DYNAMICS; BEHAVIOR; CONVERGENCE

摘要

Coordination games feature two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. We investigate learning dynamics where agents observe the actions of a random sample of their opponents. First, we show that when all agents have the same sample size, whether it is small or large, their behavior converges to one of the pure coordinated equilibria. By contrast, our main results show that stable miscoordination often persists when some agents make decisions based on small samples while others rely on large samples. (JEL C72, C73, C78)