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作者：Rachidi, Tobias
作者单位：Fraunhofer Gesellschaft; Fraunhofer Germany; Fraunhofer Applied Information Technology
摘要：This paper studies the design of voting mechanisms. There are multiple alternatives, and the voters have generalized single-peaked preferences derived from median spaces as introduced in Nehring and Puppe (2007b). This class of preferences covers a wide range of economically relevant domains, and it is much larger than the well-known single-peaked preferences on a line. I characterize the welfare-maximizing voting rules among all social choice functions satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity...
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作者：Bhaskar, Dhruva
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：This paper studies monitoring in long-term, self-enforcing relationships with adverse selection and moral hazard. Monitoring is used to screen low types by incentivizing them to shirk. Once high types have been identified, monitoring is used both to incentivize effort from high types and to provide off-path (dis)incentives for low types looking to build a reputation. This results in a key trade-off: providing cost-efficient incentives to high types, versus screening low types faster. The optim...
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作者：Murooka, Takeshi; Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：University of Osaka; University of Osaka
摘要：We study an adverse selection environment in which a buyer's inferential ability is heterogeneous: A rational type correctly infers the value of the good from a seller's offer, whereas a na & iuml;ve type is inattentive to the correlation between the seller's private information and the offer. We characterize the optimal menu mechanism that maximizes the seller's profits or trade surplus. Notably, no matter how severe the adverse selection is, all types of buyers trade. We then provide conditi...
