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作者：Martimort, David; Pouyet, Jerome
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CY Cergy Paris Universite; ESSEC Business School
摘要：Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on t...
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作者：Beheshti, David; Neller, Seth
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
摘要：In this article, we examine the importance of individual physicians in explaining the significant variation in prescription drug spending in Medicare Part D. By tracking prescribing behavior before and after physician relocations, we find that movers' prescribing converges toward the average of their new location. However, this convergence is far from complete, highlighting the importance of idiosyncratic physician-specific factors. Overall, these physician-specific factors explain about 60 to...
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作者：Mukherjee, Arijit; Qi, Zijian; Vasconcelos, Luis
作者单位：Michigan State University; Texas Tech University System; Texas Tech University; University of Technology Sydney; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：When managers rely on their subordinates for local information but cannot commit to how such information is used, the incentives for effort and information elicitation become intertwined. This incentive problem influences the firm's job design decision, that is, whether to assign all tasks in a job to one worker (individual assignment) or split those among a group (team assignment). Team assignment facilitates information elicitation but suffers from diseconomies of scope in incentive provisio...
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作者：Peitz, Martin; Sato, Susumu
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within-group and cross-group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group. We explore the effects of platform entry, a change of incumbent platforms' quality under free entry, and the degree of compatibility. We show how the analysis can be ...
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作者：Doval, Laura; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Columbia University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：Product personalization opens the door to price discrimination. A rich product line allows firms to better tailor products to consumers' tastes, but the mere choice of a product carries valuable information about consumers that can be leveraged for price discrimination. We study this trade-off in an upstream - downstream model, where a consumer buys a good of variable quality upstream, followed by an indivisible good downstream. The downstream firm's use of the consumer's purchase history for ...
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作者：Catonini, Emiliano; Stepanov, Sergey
作者单位：New York University; NYU Shanghai; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：A privately informed sender can commit to any disclosure policy toward a receiver, whose actions affect the utility of the sender. We show that full disclosure is optimal under a sufficient condition with some desirable properties. First, it speaks directly to the parties' utility functions, as opposed to the sender's indirect utility function; this makes it easily interpretable and verifiable. Second, it does not require the sender's payoff to be a function of the posterior mean state. Third,...
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作者：Darmouni, Olivier; Aberg, Simon Essig; Tolvanen, Juha
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Rome Tor Vergata
摘要：Firms in decentralized markets often trade using quantity contracts, agreements specifying quantity prior to the point of sale. These contracts are valuable because they provide quantity assurance, as trading frictions could prevent a buyer and seller from matching in the spot market. However, quantity contracts prevent sellers from optimally allocating production across buyers after market conditions realize. Using proprietary invoice data, we estimate a model of quantity contracts in the pul...
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作者：Liski, Matti; Vehvilainen, Iivo
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：Using micro-data on over 160 million bids to buy and sell from three major electricity markets, we study efficiency improvements resulting from technologies such as storage. Consumer benefits arise not from stabilized prices but from changes in general price levels. To unpack the findings, we develop a set of price-theory results, demonstrating that the convexity of market excess demand, derived from the bids, serves as a novel measure that strongly predicts consumer benefits across all market...
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作者：Tan, Teck Yong
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：This article studies price discrimination by a seller who uses data on observables that buyers can control (or manipulate) at a cost. If the seller's discriminatory prices are offered covertly, equilibrium market segmentation is always coarse, resulting in limited price discrimination. In contrast, if prices must be transparently posted, every buyer pays a personalized price in equilibrium, though this does not always reduce buyer or social welfare. The analysis sheds new light on calls for tr...
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作者：Xiang, Jia
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：I estimate a Bayesian persuasion model to examine how financial incentives and asymmetric information shape physician-patient interactions. This approach offers new insights into the role of insurance. First, the model predicts that patients' coinsurance moderates physicians' responsiveness to increases in service fees. This prediction is supported by a difference-in-differences analysis using Chinese health insurance claims data with random variation in physicians' reimbursement and patients'...
