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作者：Zhang, Wenzhang
作者单位：Zhejiang University
摘要：We study the optimal design of a monopoly platform that interacts with heterogeneous firms and consumers who face uncertainty about product values and prices. Consumers search randomly among firms recommended by the platform. The platform designs a menu of contracts tailored to different firm types and allocates consumer visits across these firms. We show that the optimal platform design creates a superstar effect, whereby high-type firms capture a disproportionately large market share, and im...
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作者：Ahmad, Amal; Naeher, Dominik; Vollmer, Sebastian
作者单位：Wageningen University & Research; University of Gottingen
摘要：Incentivizing innovation through buyouts may alleviate the social costs associated with patent power, but the political economy and feasibility of this potentially important financing mechanism have been understudied. We study an international setting of countries with different innovation and financing capabilities, and where financing governments rely on taxes to fund buyouts and care about the electoral popularity of their decisions. Subsequent distributional conflict arises between countri...
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作者：Chen, Yi; Du, Kai; Stocken, Phillip; Wang, Zhe
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Macau; Dartmouth College
摘要：We study a two-period learning model where a sequentially rational regulator builds a reputation for strict enforcement and self-interested firms test the regulator's enforcement propensity through their misconduct. In the transparent setting, where misconduct and enforcement are observable between the firms, the regulator's reputation concern endogenously creates positive or negative enforcement externalities between the firms. When the reputation concern is strong, the enforcement externalit...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Varas, Felipe
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We study strategic trading by a privately informed blockholder who monitors a company and trades its shares. Private information results in larger block sizes in good states, but by increasing the speed of the blockholder's selling, it can result in lower block sizes in bad states. Despite the heterogeneous impact on expected block size, we show that asymmetric information leads to Pareto improvements: it raises stock prices, benefits small uninformed shareholders, and benefits the block owner...
