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作者：Peitz, Martin; Sobolev, Anton
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Biased recommendations arise naturally in markets with heterogeneous consumers. We study a model in which a monopolist offers an experience good to a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes and makes personalized purchase recommendations. We provide conditions under which a firm makes welfare-reducing purchase recommendations with positive probability, resulting in inflated recommendations. We extend this insight to a setting in which an intermediary makes the recommendations, wherea...
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作者：Shi, Fanqi; Zhang, Yutong; Chen, Litian
作者单位：Peking University; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the information design and pricing decision of a multi-product monopolist who faces a buyer with unit demand. Under omniscient disclosure, we show that one profit-maximizing menu reveals the identity of the highest quality product and allocates that product, provided a type-specific quality threshold is met. This menu remains optimal under private disclosure if the buyer's value has constant differences in quality and type, or if the value has non-decreasing differences in quality and...
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作者：Vohra, Akhil
作者单位：University of Exeter; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Influencers, from propagandists to sellers, expend vast resources targeting agents who amplify their message through word-of-mouth communication. While agents differ in network position, they also differ in their bias: Agents may naturally read articles with a particular slant or buy products from a certain seller. Absent competition, an influencer prefers targeting central agents and those biased against it. If agents are unbiased, competition leads to influencers targeting more central agent...
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作者：Myatt, David P.; Ronayne, David
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：We study the pricing of homogeneous products sold to customers who consider different sets of suppliers. We identify prices that are stable in the sense that no firm wishes to undercut a rival or to raise its price when rivals are able to respond by offering special deals. We derive stable and dispersed prices across several price-consideration specifications. We contrast the implications against those of conventional approaches.
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作者：Xu, Wenji; Yang, Shuoguang
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：A long-lived seller sells a new product of unknown value by offering prices and recommendations to short-lived consumers in continuous time. The seller receives consumer feedback about the product at a rate that increases with the instantaneous sales volume. The optimal selling mechanism features episodes of price discounts, during which the seller discontinuously lowers the price and offers unwarranted recommendations to consumers. The optimal pricing strategy depends on the nature of consume...
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作者：Chen, Yanyou
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：The trade-off between market power and efficiency gains is central to antitrust analyses of mergers, but empirical evidence quantifying efficiencies remains limited. Using transaction-level data from U.S. freight railroads (1985-2005), this article quantifies merger-induced cost efficiencies, driven mainly by eliminating inter-railroad interchange costs and reoptimization of routing and resource allocation within integrated networks. I develop a spatial equilibrium model with oligopolistic com...
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作者：Guan, Junyan; Xu, Boli
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Iowa
摘要：This article considers an auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show that the signaling incentive would lower the seller's payoff and the probability of sale. We estimate the model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. Counterfactual simulations suggest that a secret reserve price could shut down the signaling incentive and improve both the seller's payoff and the probability of sale, ...
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作者：Kim, Harim
作者单位：University of Connecticut
摘要：The energy transition from coal to gas is reshaping the power sector to rely more on gas generation, which is cleaner but has more variable input costs. Using counterfactual analysis, I study the competitive effects of this transition, by considering several transition paths that differ in the types of firms involved in retiring coal plants and investing in gas plants. I show that the variable nature of the marginal cost of gas generation creates an environment in which market power could incr...
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作者：Fabra, Natalia; Llobet, Gerard
摘要：This article investigates the influence of technological ownership on pricing strategies and productive efficiency. Our motivation comes from the evolving landscape of electricity markets where firms are transitioning from diversified to specialized portfolios, focusing on renewable energy or fossil fuels. Our theoretical model demonstrates that diversified firms compete more vigorously than their specialized counterparts. Conversely, specialized firms exhibit higher productive efficiency but ...
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作者：Yuan, Zhe; Barwick, Panle Jia
作者单位：Zhejiang University; University of Wisconsin System; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Wisconsin Madison; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：This article proposes an empirical framework and a novel equilibrium concept to analyze network competition in the airline industry. A two-stage entry model links direct and indirect flights, using a technological relationship estimated from data to mimic the hub-and-spoke network. It employs revealed-preference arguments to bound fixed cost parameters, estimated using state-of-the-art econometric methods. Ignoring network externality undervalues the benefits of additional flights by 13.2% and...
