Strategic Influencers and the Shaping of Beliefs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vohra, Akhil
• 署名单位: University of Exeter; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70012
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: NETWORKS

摘要

Influencers, from propagandists to sellers, expend vast resources targeting agents who amplify their message through word-of-mouth communication. While agents differ in network position, they also differ in their bias: Agents may naturally read articles with a particular slant or buy products from a certain seller. Absent competition, an influencer prefers targeting central agents and those biased against it. If agents are unbiased, competition leads to influencers targeting more central agents. However, when agents have heterogeneous biases and competition is intense, the incentive to deter one's rival dominates. Influencers protect their base, targeting those with similar beliefs in equilibrium.