Multi-Product Monopolist and Information Design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shi, Fanqi; Zhang, Yutong; Chen, Litian
• 署名单位: Peking University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70033
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion

摘要

We study the information design and pricing decision of a multi-product monopolist who faces a buyer with unit demand. Under omniscient disclosure, we show that one profit-maximizing menu reveals the identity of the highest quality product and allocates that product, provided a type-specific quality threshold is met. This menu remains optimal under private disclosure if the buyer's value has constant differences in quality and type, or if the value has non-decreasing differences in quality and type and the threshold type is independent of quality. We also characterize the conditions under which an ex-ante and non-discriminatory posted price mechanism is optimal.