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作者：Rappoport, Daniel
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：A key feature of communication with evidence is skepticism: a receiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. I study when a change in the receivers prior belief about the sender's evidence induces more skepticism, i.e., induces the receiver, regardless of his preferences, to take an equilibrium action that is less favorable for the sender following every message. I provide a definition of when one receiver's prior belief expects more evidence t...
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作者：Finster, Simon; Goldberg, Paul W.; Lock, Edwin
作者单位：Johannes Kepler University Linz; University of Oxford; University of London; King's College London
摘要：In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense or maximize the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a notion of utilitarian efficiency that respects buyers' demands and budgets. Our main contribution establishes that when buyers have linear valuations, competitive equilibrium prices are unique and revenue-op...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Kuvalear, Aditya V.; Lipnowski, Elliot
作者单位：New York University; University of Essex; Yale University
摘要：We study project selection and development by a principal, interacting with two agents, each of whom wants his respective project selected. When the best choice is uncertain, keeping both projects alive gives the principal the ability to adapt her choice in the future, but implies an efficiency loss of effort being spent on the project finally not chosen. We show that a time-varying threshold rule is uniquely optimal: the principal selects the first project to achieve a sufficient lead. The op...
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作者：Sandmann, Christopher; Bonneton, Nicolas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Vanderbilt University
摘要：This paper proves the existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in the canonical search-and-matching model with heterogeneous agents. Non-stationarity entails that the number and characteristics of unmatched agents evolve endogenously over time. An equilibrium exists under minimal regularity conditions and for both paradigms considered in the literature: transferable and nontransferable utility. To address potential discontinuities in match opportunities across types, our analysis introduces a...
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作者：Adler, Matthew D.; Bossert, Walter; Cato, Susumu; Kamaga, Kohei
作者单位：Duke University; Universite de Montreal; University of Tokyo; Sophia University
摘要：Although sufficientarianism has been gaining interest as a theory of distributive justice in recent years, it has not been examined in the presence of risk. We propose an ex post approach to sufficientarianism that has a strong link to ex post prioritarianism. Both ex post criteria are based on an axiom that we refer to as prospect independence of the unconcerned, a natural extension of the independence axiom known from the literature that focuses on situations with no risk. We characterize a ...
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
作者单位：University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：A group of agents with a common prior receive informative signals about an unknown state repeatedly over time. If these signals were public, agents' beliefs would be identical and commonly known. This suggests that if signals were private, then the more correlated they are, the greater is the commonality of beliefs. We show that, in fact, the opposite may be true. In the long run, conditionally independent signals may achieve greater commonality of beliefs than correlated signals.
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In repeated principal-agent problems and games, more outcomes are implementable when performance signals are privately observed by a principal or mediator with commitment power than when the same signals are publicly observed and form the basis of a recursive equilibrium. We investigate the gains from nonrecursive equilibria (e.g., review strategies) based on privately observed signals. Under a pairwise identification condition, we find that the gains from nonrecursive equilibria are small: th...
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作者：Gavan, Malachy James; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：University of Liverpool; Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA
摘要：Implementation theory is concerned with the existence of mechanisms in which, at each state of the world, all equilibria result in outcomes that are within a given social choice correspondence (SCC). However, if agents make mistakes, if their preferences or the solution concept are misspecified, or if the designer is limited in what can be used as punishments, then it may be desirable to insist that also deviations result in acceptable outcomes. Safe implementation adds this extra requirement ...
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作者：Curello, Gregorio; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Oxford
摘要：How best to incentivize prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivize disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of une...
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作者：Ball, Ian; Kattwinkel, Deniz
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; University College London
摘要：We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each test. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all other types. If this condition holds, then the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. We use this reduced form to solve for profit-maximizing ...
