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作者：Bergstrom, Katy; Dodds, William
作者单位：Tulane University
摘要：This paper develops a general theory to recover the inverse welfare function that rationalizes a given tax schedule as optimal. Our theory allows for complex environments including the presence of multidimensional tax schedules, bunching/jumping behavior, optimization frictions, general equilibrium effects, and externalities. We show that inverse welfare functions can be used to test for Pareto efficiency, construct Pareto improving reforms, and characterize the set of welfare improving local ...
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作者：Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：I study strategic transmission of verifiable information through intermediaries, and find that equilibrium full disclosure requires that all players are biased in the same direction relative to the decision maker. By embedding this strategic disclosure game into networks, I explore the intersection of information transmission in networks and strategic communication-two major economic theory research strands. When each networked player may hold information useful for any other's decision, I fin...
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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Tokyo
摘要：Matching markets are often fragmented, organized at a small local level. While integration of matching markets may lead to welfare gains by expanding choice, it may also harm some market participants by increasing competition for the same resources. We show that every good mechanism fails the monotonicity requirement that no individuals be hurt by integration. Then we provide characterization results that identify conditions under which monotonicity becomes compatible with other desirable prop...
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作者：Hebert, Benjamin; Zhong, Weijie
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Cambridge
摘要：We investigate the management of information provision to maximize user engagement. A principal sequentially reveals signals to an agent who has a limited amount of information processing capacity and can choose to exit at any time. We identify a dilution strategy-sending rare but highly informative signals-that maximizes user engagement. The platform's engagement metric shapes the direction and magnitude of biases in provided information relative to a user-optimal benchmark. Even without inte...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We analyze the existence of equilibria with complex dynamics in a policy framework with time inconsistency. We consider an economy where, in each period, the policy maker in power determines the level of a durable public good (or bad) that creates strategic linkages across policy periods. When the decision-making process is time consistent-such as when a benevolent planner sets policy in every period-the economy exhibits a unique equilibrium where the state converges to a deterministic steady ...
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作者：Sanktjohanser, Anna
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：I consider a model of reputational bargaining in which the stubborn type can choose their initial demand. There are two types of players: rational and stubborn. The game has two stages: a demand stage and a concession stage. Types can pool or separate in equilibrium for any fixed probability of facing a stubborn type. When the probability of facing a stubborn type is small, any feasible payoff can be achieved in equilibrium for either type. When the probability is large, there is either immedi...
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作者：Kostadinov, Rumen
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：I study a dynamic model of durable-good monopoly where the seller minimizes lifetime regret against the worst-case type of buyer. The optimal mechanism is time consistent: at no point can the seller benefit from replacing it with another mechanism. Despite this, the optimal mechanism cannot be supported in an equilibrium without commitment. This is because the seller's regret is endogenously determined by the best counterfactual payoffs he can obtain against every type, and these payoffs vary ...
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作者：Ely, Jeffrey C.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Nonpartisan voters can become polarized not because of ideology but because it is optimal for them to remain uninformed and cancel out the votes of uninformed voters on the other side. Indeed, when stuck in such a state of polarization, it is socially optimal to do so. Dynamics can lead an otherwise well-functioning assembly into irreversible polarization. Reputation effects might only make things worse.
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作者：Morgan, John; Tumlinson, Justin; Vardy, Felix
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Exeter; Technical University of Munich; International Monetary Fund
摘要：In the context of Krugman's (1979) canonical new trade model, we demonstrate that a country is better off in autarky than in free and costless trade when the productivity of its trading partner is sufficiently low.
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作者：Kubler, Felix; Selden, Larry; Wei, Xiao
作者单位：University of Zurich; Columbia University; Fudan University; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics
摘要：For general choice spaces, standard dynamic preference models cannot simultaneously satisfy the properties of time consistency, the separation of time and risk preferences, and the ability to accommodate an indifference to the timing of when risk is resolved. In the context of a consumption-portfolio choice problem often underlying asset pricing and macro models, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions such that all three properties are satisfied. We also show that quantitatively reasona...
