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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of London; University College London
摘要：We present a model in which news media shape beliefs by providing information (signals about an exogenous state) and narratives (models of what determines outcomes). To amplify consumers' engagement, the media maximize their anticipatory utility. We characterize the optimal monopolistic media strategy, highlighting the synergy between false narratives and biased information. Consumer heterogeneity gives rise to a novel menu-design problem due to an equilibrium data externality among consumers....
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作者：Greinecker, Michael; Nielsen, Michael
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We show with a counterexample that Theorem 1 of Can intergenerational equity be operationalized? is wrong. The problem with Theorem 1 does not affect the remaining results of the paper, which form its core.
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作者：Ben-porath, Elchanan; Dekel, Eddie; Lipman, Barton L.
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Boston University
摘要：We explore two interrelated models of hard information. In the evidence-acquisition model, an agent with private information searches for evidence to show the principal about her type. In the signal-choice model, a privately informed agent chooses an action generating a random signal whose realization may be correlated with her type. The signal-choice model is a special case, and as we show, under certain conditions, a reduced form of the evidence-acquisition model. We develop tools for charac...
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作者：Jacobovic, Royi; Levy, Yehuda John; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Glasgow
摘要：A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite action spaces, bounded payoffs, Polish type spaces, and nested information admit a Bayesian equilibrium.
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作者：Hu, Gaoji; Li, Jiangtao; Quah, John K-H.; Tang, Rui
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Singapore Management University; National University of Singapore; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We propose a novel concept of rationalization, called coarse rationalization, tailored for the analysis of datasets where an agent's choices are imperfectly observed. We characterize those datasets, which are rationalizable in this sense and present an efficient algorithm to verify the characterizing condition. We then demonstrate how our results can be applied through a duality approach to test the rationalizability of datasets with perfectly observed choices but imprecisely observed linear b...
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作者：Mekonnen, Teddy
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper examines when the public provision of information in search markets improves welfare. I consider a two-sided frictional search market in which buyers match with vertically differentiated sellers. The market is segmented into submarkets based on seller types. Such segmentation serves as a public signal that buyers use to direct their search. Given a segmentation, I characterize both the socially efficient and the equilibrium allocation of buyers across submarkets, and identify a Hosi...
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作者：Kim, Daehyun; Obara, Ichiro
作者单位：University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper studies how improved monitoring affects the limit equilibrium payoff set for stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. We introduce a simple generalization of Blackwell garbling called weighted garbling in order to compare different monitoring structures for this class of games. Our main result is the monotonicity of the limit perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoff set with respect to this information order. We show that the limit PPE payoff set expands when the monitoring...
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作者：Moeller, Markus
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：In the standard one-to-one agent-object matching model, I consider a central matching authority that publicly announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then initiates a matching. Following Akbarpour and Li (2020), the authority's commitment to the announced mechanism is limited to mechanisms rendering participants' observations indistinguishable from it. I call an announced mechanism transparent if any deviation from it would be detected.The main findings identify trade-offs regarding transpare...
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作者：Moreno-Garcia, Emma; Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo
作者单位：University of Salamanca; Universidad de Chile
摘要：We compare the degree of coalitional manipulability across stable school-choice mechanisms. Although no stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for all school choice contexts, we show that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the least manipulable by coalitions, whereas the school-optimal stable mechanism is the most coalitionally manipulable. These results still hold when students can only report truncated preferences, when the set of coalitions is limited, or when schools cannot be decla...
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作者：Antler, Yair; Bachi, Benjamin
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa
摘要：We develop a model of non-Bayesian decision-making in which an agent obtains a signal about a relevant economic fundamental and subsequently takes an action. To interpret the signal, the agent calibrates a simple prediction rule based on a data set that consists of previous signals and state realizations. Her subsequent action affects the probability with which the current signal and the corresponding state realization will be observed and recorded in the data set that will be used in future d...
