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作者：Xu, Boli
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：We study dynamic partnerships where the output evolves stochastically, each player can exit at any time, and players who have exited continue to accrue some benefits if the remaining players keep contributing to the partnership. Players can strategically exit to free-ride on their partners' contributions, knowing that it may trigger subsequent exits of their partners. We characterize the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium. When players have sufficiently large free-riding incentives and a medium...
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作者：Grigoryan, Aram
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：The continuum matching model has been instrumental in the studies of finite economies. Yet, there is limited theoretical justification on whether and when a continuum model approximates large finite problems. In this paper, I study the following question: if we randomly sample finite economies from some distribution, will the stable assignments of these finite economies converge to a stable assignment of the continuum economy as we increase the sample size? I provide a simple condition, which ...
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作者：Atakan, Alp; Richter, Michael; Tsur, Matan
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Bristol
摘要：We study markets where heterogeneous agents first make investment decisions and then engage in a costly search to form productive matches. The trading process is a random search and bargaining with explicit search costs. Despite potential hold-up and matching problems, we prove that the constrained efficient allocation is an equilibrium: the agents' private incentives to invest and to accept/reject potential partners as they search are perfectly aligned with the social benefit. Furthermore, we...
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作者：Lang, Matthias; Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：University of Basel
摘要：We study the welfare effects of ambiguous product information for a buyer with alpha-max-min preferences and a price-setting seller. The buyer privately receives information about her valuation. We show that both the seller and the buyer can benefit when this information is ambiguous, and we characterize all possible combinations of producer and consumer surplus, as evaluated under ambiguity-sensitive preferences. Ambiguity concerning the valuation perceived by the buyer when making the purcha...
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作者：Liao, Xiaoye; Szkup, Michal
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We investigate how differences in initial beliefs and sequential information choices affect the likelihood of coordination failure. To do so, we embed interim information acquisition (i.e., information acquisition after observing initial private information) into a standard global game mode with a normal information structure and improper prior. We find that the likelihood of coordination on welfare-inferior equilibrium is invariant to precision, cost, and availability of information. We show ...
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作者：Vellodi, Nikhil
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：I study the impact of consumer reviews on the incentives for firms to participate in the market. I develop a model of endogenous entry in which firms produce goods of heterogeneous, unknown quality. Consumers engage in directed search, and prices are exogenously fixed. A rater uses consumer reviews to construct firm-specific ratings that are informative of quality and help consumers direct their search. The main insight of the paper is that suppressing the reviews of highly-rated firms strengt...
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作者：Rosenthal, Maxwell
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper studies a moral hazard problem in which the principal does not know the agent's beliefs about the output generating process. The agent is risk neutral, transfers are subject to limited liability, and the principal evaluates contracts according to their worst-case payoff against a rich set of plausible agent beliefs. With common knowledge of the relationship between effort and expected output, optimal contracts are of the form w(y)=max(alpha y + beta,0). With or without common knowle...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Rehbeck, John
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Models of stochastic choice typically use conditional choice probabilities given menus as the primitive for analysis, but in the field these are often hard to observe. We consider the case where an analyst has access to a marginal stochastic choice dataset containing the marginal distributions of available menus and of choices, but not to conditional choice frequencies. The Random Utility Model (RUM) has no testable implications for such datasets, but any restriction on the domain of feasible ...
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作者：Kartik, Navin; Zhong, Weijie
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints identify the payoff set. The buyer can obtain the entire surplus; often, noninformational mechanisms cannot enlarge the payoff set. We also study payoffs when the buyer is more informed than the seller, and when the buyer is fully informed. All three payoff sets c...
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作者：Amendola, Nicola; Araujo, Luis; Ferraris, Leo
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Sapienza University Rome; Michigan State University; Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：This paper compares digital and physical currency, focusing on a single intrinsic difference: digital, unlike physical currency, allows the monetary authority to trace the monetary flows in and out of the accounts. We show that this technological advance in recordkeeping can be used by the monetary authority to improve upon physical currency and achieve efficiency in a wide range of circumstances.
