作者：Cheng, Xiaoyu
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：A decision-maker faces uncertainty governed by a data-generating process (DGP), which is only known to belong to a set of sequences of independent but possibly non-identical distributions. A robust decision maximizes the expected payoff against the worst possible DGP in this set. This paper characterizes when and how such robust decisions can be objectively improved with data; that is, can yield higher expected payoffs under the true DGP regardless of which DGP is the truth. It further develop...
作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Shaiderman, Dimitry
作者单位：Durham University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In the classical Bayesian persuasion model, an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. This work extends this classical model to a dynamic setting where the state of nature evolves according to a Markovian law, allowing for a more realistic representation of real-world situations where the state of nature evolves over time. In this repeated persuasion model, an optimal disclosure strategy of the sender must balance between obtaining a high-stage payoff and disclos...
