Ruth, Anthony, and Clarence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ely, Jeffrey C.
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE6224
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Repeated games; folk theorem; polarization; reputation; equilibrium; INFORMATION; BEHAVIOR

摘要

Nonpartisan voters can become polarized not because of ideology but because it is optimal for them to remain uninformed and cancel out the votes of uninformed voters on the other side. Indeed, when stuck in such a state of polarization, it is socially optimal to do so. Dynamics can lead an otherwise well-functioning assembly into irreversible polarization. Reputation effects might only make things worse.