-
作者：Bliss, Barbara A.; Partnoy, Frank; Furchtgott, Michael
作者单位：University of San Diego; University of San Diego; Microsoft
摘要：We exploit the exogenous shock of a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision on securities class action loss causation requirements to examine two ways that firms bundle information with restatements: positive bundling of good news and noise bundling of additional bad news. We find that positive bundling offsets price declines and results in less litigation. In contrast, noise bundling magnifies price declines, but nevertheless deters litigation by confounding which bad news caused a decline. Non-bund...
-
作者：Hanley, Kathleen W.; Jagolinzer, Alan D.; Nikolova, Stanislava
作者单位：Lehigh University; University of Cambridge; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：We examine whether fair value (FV) input levels and estimation sources are related to FV inflation, the difference between an insurer's FV estimate and the consensus FV estimate across the security's holders. FV inflation is higher, and self-estimation more likely, when insurers report using Level 3 inputs when the consensus level is 2. Regardless of the level, FV is greater when self-estimated. Public insurers that inflate FV through self-estimation potentially obfuscate detection by reportin...
-
作者：Bradshaw, Mark T.; Christensen, Theodore E.; Gee, Kurt H.; Whipple, Benjamin C.
作者单位：Boston College; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Stanford University
摘要：We use newly available GAAP forecasts to document that traditionally-identified GAAP forecast errors contain 37% measurement error. Correcting for this measurement error, we settle a long-standing debate regarding investor preference for GAAP versus non-GAAP earnings and provide strong evidence of a preference for non-GAAP earnings. We also revisit the use of non-GAAP exclusions to meet analysts' forecasts when GAAP earnings fall short. Results indicate that 34% of these traditionally-identifi...
-
作者：Sutherland, Andrew
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I examine how credit reporting affects where firms access credit and how lenders contract with them. I use within firm-time and lender-time tests that exploit lenders joining a credit bureau and sharing information in a staggered pattern. I find information sharing reduces relationship switching costs, particularly for firms that are young, small, or have had no defaults. After sharing, lenders transition away from relationship contracting, in two ways: contract maturities in new relationships...
-
作者：Gao, Pingyang; Jiang, Xu
作者单位：University of Chicago; Duke University
摘要：This paper investigates banks' reporting choices in the context of bank runs. A fundamental-based run imposes market discipline on insolvent banks, but a panic-based run closes banks that could have survived with better coordination among creditors. We augment a bank-run model with the bank's reporting choices. We show that banks with intermediate fundamentals have stronger incentive to misreport than those in the two tails. Moreover, reporting discretion reduces panic-based runs, but excessiv...
-
作者：Chapman, Kimball
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：This paper provides new evidence that investor attention explains positive returns around earnings announcements and reconciles the attention explanation with information-based explanations in the literature. I use earnings notifications, which are attention-grabbing announcements of the upcoming earnings date but otherwise provide little new information. I find positive returns, more EDGAR searches, and higher trading volumes on notification days. I also find that attention and returns around...
-
作者：Lyu, Changjiang; Wang, Kemin; Zhang, Frank; Zhang, Xin
作者单位：Fudan University; Yale University
摘要：We apply the discontinuity methodology from the accounting literature to a political economy setting of GDP reporting and examine whether Chinese local governments manage regional GDP numbers. We find strong evidence of discontinuities around zero in the distribution of actual minus target GDP growth rates. The frequencies of just meeting or beating GDP growth targets are about five (four) times the frequencies of just missing targets at the prefecture (province) level. The results are stronge...
-
作者：Bushman, Robert M.; Davidson, Robert H.; Dey, Aiyesha; Smith, Abbie
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; Georgetown University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Chicago; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives' behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively ar...
-
作者：Nicoletti, Allison
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：I examine whether bank regulators and external auditors have conflicting effects on loan loss provision timeliness, an accounting choice associated with important economic consequences and a potential conflict between regulators and auditors. In the absence of the other group, auditors and strict regulators are each positively associated with timeliness. However, audits are negatively associated with timeliness when strict regulators are present, consistent with a conflict for which auditors a...
-
作者：Chen, Tai-Yuan; Zhang, Guochang; Zhou, Yi
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Hong Kong; Fudan University
摘要：Non-compete covenants are widely used in employment contracts to promote employee stability. Using legal amendments of non-compete enforceability as a natural experiment, we find that as non-compete enforceability increases, firms display an increased likelihood of meeting short-term earnings benchmarks, lower discretionary expenditures, and declining future performance. These effects are more pronounced when CEOs have lower ability or shorter tenures, and when firms have more growth opportuni...
