Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls, culture and tail risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bushman, Robert M.; Davidson, Robert H.; Dey, Aiyesha; Smith, Abbie
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; Georgetown University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Chicago; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.11.014
• 发表日期: 2018
• 关键词: financial institutions; corporate governance; overconfidence; Managers; BEHAVIOR; VALUES; COMPENSATION; COMPETITION; industry; CRISIS

摘要

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives' behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.