Does credit reporting lead to a decline in relationship lending? Evidence from information sharing technology

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sutherland, Andrew
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.03.002
• 发表日期: 2018
• 关键词: DISCLOSURE REGULATION; RELATIONSHIP BANKING; level evidence; US FIRMS; COMPETITION; debt; QUALITY; MARKET; externalities; allocation

摘要

I examine how credit reporting affects where firms access credit and how lenders contract with them. I use within firm-time and lender-time tests that exploit lenders joining a credit bureau and sharing information in a staggered pattern. I find information sharing reduces relationship switching costs, particularly for firms that are young, small, or have had no defaults. After sharing, lenders transition away from relationship contracting, in two ways: contract maturities in new relationships are shorter, and lenders are less willing to provide financing to their delinquent borrowers. My results highlight the mixed effects of transparency-improving financial technologies on credit availability.