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作者：Erkens, Michael H. R.; Gan, Ying; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
摘要：We develop a Clawback Strength Index and show that while some firms adopt unambiguous and strong clawback provisions, others adopt weak ones. We find that strong clawback adopters experience improvements in financial reporting quality, fewer CEO turnovers, and lower CEO pay. We advance two possible explanations: First, clawback strength may be primarily responsible for the improvements in reporting quality. Second, strong clawbacks may yield benefits because they are part of a broader reform p...
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作者：Glaeser, Stephen
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：I examine the effects of proprietary information on corporate transparency and voluntary disclosure. To do so, I develop and validate two measures of firms' reliance on trade secrecy: one based on 10-K disclosures and one based on subsequent litigation outcomes. I complement these measures by using the staggered passage of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as a shock to trade secrecy. I find that firms that begin to rely more heavily on trade secrecy substitute increased voluntary disclosure of no...
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作者：Bozanic, Zahn; Roulstone, Darren T.; Van Buskirk, Andrew
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We identify forward-looking statements (FLS) in firms' disclosures to distinguish between forecast-like (quantitative statements about earnings) and other, or non-forecast-like, FLS. We show that, like earnings forecasts, other FLS generate significant investor and analyst responses. Unlike earnings forecasts, other FLS are issued more frequently when uncertainty is higher. We then show that earnings-related FLS are more sensitive to uncertainty than quantitative statements, suggesting that ma...
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作者：Lennox, Clive; Wang, Zi-Tian; Wu, Xi
作者单位：University of Southern California; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Central University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Acquirers are motivated to overstate earnings prior to stock-financed acquisitions. We hypothesize that audits help to detect and correct such overstatements. We test this using a difference-in-differences design, which compares audit adjustments to earnings for stock financed and cash-financed acquirers before versus after the acquisitions. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find larger downward adjustments in the audits immediately before stock-financed acquisitions. Further analysis of regu...
