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作者:Chu, Ling; Simunic, Dan A.; Ye, Minlei; Zhang, Ping
作者单位:Wilfrid Laurier University; University of British Columbia; University of Toronto
摘要:We develop a measure to capture an, audit firm's competitive position in a local audit market based on the transaction costs of changing audit firms included in DeAngelo's (1981) multi-period audit pricing model. Our competition measure reflects the size difference between the largest audit firm in a market specified by client industry at the city level and the other audit firms operating in that market. We find that audit fees of a client decrease as this size difference increases. This resul...
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作者:Hoopes, Jeffrey L.; Robinson, Leslie; Slemrod, Joel
作者单位:University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Dartmouth College; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要:We investigate the consequences of public disclosure of information from company income tax returns filed in Australia. Supporters of more disclosure argue that increased transparency will improve tax compliance, while opponents argue that it will divulge sensitive information that is, in many cases, misunderstood. Our results show that in Australia large private companies experienced some consumer backlash and, perhaps partly in anticipation, some acted to avoid disclosure. We detect a small ...
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作者:Bernard, Darren; Burgstahler, David; Kaya, Devrimi
作者单位:University of London; London Business School; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Ruhr University Bochum
摘要:We examine size management by European private firms for which disclosure requirements increase at size thresholds. Our estimates suggest at least 8% of firms near thresholds that impose income statement disclosure manage size downward, and the average firm that manages size sacrifices more than 6% of its assets. We find that multiple determinants of proprietary costs predict this behavior, and that size management to avoid mandatory audits, which are similarly imposed at size thresholds, is o...
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作者:Chen, Yi-Chun; Hung, Mingyi; Wang, Yongxiang
作者单位:Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Southern California
摘要:We examine how mandatory disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) impacts firm performance and social externalities. Our analysis exploits China's 2008 mandate requiring firms to disclose CSR activities, using a difference-in-differences design. Although the mandate does not require firms to spend on CSR, we find that mandatory CSR reporting firms experience a decrease in profitability subsequent to the mandate. In addition, the cities most impacted by the disclosure mandate experie...
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作者:Cuny, Christine
作者单位:New York University
摘要:I investigate whether access to fundamental information enhances retail investors' bargaining power, reducing the premium that small municipal bond investors pay over large investors. I find a reduction in this small trade premium after the introduction of an online disclosure repository that lowers retail investors' information acquisition costs. This finding is limited to issuers whose disclosures are disseminated through the repository. The finding is pronounced for issuers that impose high...
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作者:Bettis, J. Carr; Bizjak, John; Coles, Jeffrey L.; Kalpathy, Swaminathan
作者单位:Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Texas Christian University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Texas Christian University
摘要:The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards reported in company disclosures versus economic value. We also find that equity-based grants continue to convey significant compensation convexity (vega) after ASC 718 (2005) and that, counter to recent...
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作者:Dye, Ronald A.; Hughes, John S.
作者单位:Northwestern University
摘要:We study a firm's manager's voluntary disclosure decisions and those disclosure decisions' asset pricing, cost of capital, and information transfer effects in a model where investors trade multiple securities. We: develop new asset pricing formulas when the manager makes no disclosure that impose testable cross-equation restrictions on firms' market values; develop a wide array of comparative statics; obtain surprising findings about nondisclosure's effects on investors' perceptions of uncerta...
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作者:Kim, Jaewoo
作者单位:University of Rochester
摘要:Using the collapse of the junk bond market in the early 1990s as an exogenous shock to external capital, I document, in both difference-in-differences and triple difference designs, that speculative-grade firms that recognize economic losses in a timely manner experience a smaller reduction in investment following the collapse. The effect is more pronounced for speculative-grade firms with a low level of asset liquidation value. Using the excess bond premium as a proxy for fluctuations in the ...
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作者:Souther, Matthew E.
作者单位:University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要:Recent literature emphasizes the importance of a director's external network of social connections. I use a sample of closed-end funds to show that internal, within-board connections are also significant determinants of shareholder value. I find that boards with shared education, employment, and family backgrounds exhibit lower market values, higher expense ratios, higher director compensation levels, and an increased likelihood of financial misrepresentation. Director turnover is lower within...
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作者:Thong, Rong (Irene)
作者单位:University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要:Firm innovation drives both firm competitiveness and economic growth. Constructing a novel firm-patent panel database from 29 countries, I find that transparency directly boosts innovative effort by reducing managerial career concerns. This effect operates through transparency's implicit contracting role: it reduces the sensitivity of management turnover to poor innovative output. Transparency also increases innovative efficiency through its governance role in facilitating efficient allocation...