-
作者：Barkema, HG; Gomez-Mejia, LR
作者单位：Tilburg University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：A tremendous amount of research has explored the relationship, between managerial pay and firm performance. We argue that this research has generally been limited because it ignores other criteria that can be used to determine managerial pay, as well as the influence of a firm's governance structure and various contingencies. Our analysis leads to a general framework for research on executive pay. This framework is used to evaluate the present state of research in this field and the contributi...
-
作者：David, P; Kochhar, R; Levitas, E
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：This study investigated the influence of institutional investors on CEO compensation policy. Results suggest that institutional owners that have only an investment relationship with a firm influence compensation in accordance with shareholder preferences to (1) lower its level and (2) increase the proportion of long-term incentives in total compensation; However, institutions that depend on a firm for their own business are not able to influence compensation in this manner. This study extends ...
-
作者：Ezzamel, M; Watson, R
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Leeds
摘要：We argue that compensation committees will pay executives at least at the going rate and that deviations from that rate will influence subsequent pay, in a sample of large U.K. companies, we estimated whether asymmetric responses to pay anomalies explained executive pay. All three of our pay anomaly measures were statistically related to subsequent pay. Moreover, there was significant nonlinear adjustment toward the going rate for underpaid executives.
-
作者：Sanders, WG; Carpenter, MA
作者单位：Brigham Young University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Using the complementary lenses of information-processing and agency theories, this study tests the proposition that the complexity resulting from a firm's degree of internationalization will be accommodated by its governance structure. Results from a sample of large U.S. firms support this perspective, suggesting that firms manage and cope with the information-processing demands and agency issues arising from internationalization through higher, longer-term CEO pay, larger top management teams...
-
作者：Conyon, MJ; Peck, SL
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：Using panel data on large, publicly traded U.K. companies gathered between 1991 and 1994, we examined the role of board control and remuneration committees in determining management compensation. Board monitoring, measured in terms of the proportion of nonexecutive directors on a board and the presence of remuneration committees and CEO duality, had only a limited effect on the level of top management pay. An important conclusion was that top management pay and corporate performance are more a...
-
作者：Finkelstein, S; Boyd, BK
作者单位：Dartmouth College; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：The idea that managerial discretion-defined as latitude of action-may be an important determinant of CEO compensation has been recognized for some time. However, in spite of considerable work that has implicitly invoked related ideas on the sources of potential managerial contribution, a formal test of the discretion hypothesis has yet to be conducted. In addition, few studies have tested the performance consequences of CEO pay. In a sample of Fortune 1,000 firms, we found support for both a m...
-
作者：Daily, CM; Johnson, JL; Ellstrand, AE; Dalton, DR
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; California State University System; California State University Long Beach
摘要：Extant research examining the relationship between a firm's board and its CEO's compensation has focused primarily on the composition of the board-at-large. However, it may be the nature of the compensation committee, not the board as a whole, that is at issue. This study was a longitudinal assessment of the relationship between the composition of a firm's compensation committee and multiple measurements of CEO compensation. We found no evidence that captured directors led to greater levels of...
