Managerial compensation and firm performance: A general research framework

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Barkema, HG; Gomez-Mejia, LR
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/257098
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 135-145
• 关键词: executive-compensation; Ownership structure; MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION; corporate-control; ceo compensation; AGENCY-THEORY; moral hazard; strategy; incentives; systems

摘要

A tremendous amount of research has explored the relationship, between managerial pay and firm performance. We argue that this research has generally been limited because it ignores other criteria that can be used to determine managerial pay, as well as the influence of a firm's governance structure and various contingencies. Our analysis leads to a general framework for research on executive pay. This framework is used to evaluate the present state of research in this field and the contribution of the six papers in this special research forum, and to identify directions for further research.