Market comparison earnings and the bidding-up of executive cash compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ezzamel, M; Watson, R
• 署名单位: University of Manchester; University of Leeds
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/257104
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 221-231
• 关键词: performance; pay; incentives

摘要

We argue that compensation committees will pay executives at least at the going rate and that deviations from that rate will influence subsequent pay, in a sample of large U.K. companies, we estimated whether asymmetric responses to pay anomalies explained executive pay. All three of our pay anomaly measures were statistically related to subsequent pay. Moreover, there was significant nonlinear adjustment toward the going rate for underpaid executives.