Internationalization and firm governance: The roles of CEO compensation, top team composition, and board structure

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Sanders, WG; Carpenter, MA
• 署名单位: Brigham Young University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/257100
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 158-178
• 关键词: AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE; MULTINATIONAL-CORPORATIONS; DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY; executive-compensation; managerial incentives; PROFIT PERFORMANCE; procedural justice; GLOBAL STRATEGIES; REWARD SYSTEMS; management

摘要

Using the complementary lenses of information-processing and agency theories, this study tests the proposition that the complexity resulting from a firm's degree of internationalization will be accommodated by its governance structure. Results from a sample of large U.S. firms support this perspective, suggesting that firms manage and cope with the information-processing demands and agency issues arising from internationalization through higher, longer-term CEO pay, larger top management teams, and the separation of chairperson and CEO positions.