The effect of institutional investors on the level and mix of CEO compensation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: David, P; Kochhar, R; Levitas, E
• 署名单位: Nanyang Technological University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/257102
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 200-208
• 关键词: executive-compensation; Ownership structure; corporate-control; managerial incentives; firm performance; pay; top; PERSPECTIVE; POWER; COSTS

摘要

This study investigated the influence of institutional investors on CEO compensation policy. Results suggest that institutional owners that have only an investment relationship with a firm influence compensation in accordance with shareholder preferences to (1) lower its level and (2) increase the proportion of long-term incentives in total compensation; However, institutions that depend on a firm for their own business are not able to influence compensation in this manner. This study extends prior research by supporting the viewpoint that the nature of ownership in a firm is an important determinant of CEO compensation.