Compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Daily, CM; Johnson, JL; Ellstrand, AE; Dalton, DR
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; California State University System; California State University Long Beach
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/257103
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 209-220
• 关键词: CHIEF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; corporate governance; Ownership structure; golden parachutes; BOARD COMPOSITION; firm performance; SERVICE FIRMS; pay; top; bankruptcy

摘要

Extant research examining the relationship between a firm's board and its CEO's compensation has focused primarily on the composition of the board-at-large. However, it may be the nature of the compensation committee, not the board as a whole, that is at issue. This study was a longitudinal assessment of the relationship between the composition of a firm's compensation committee and multiple measurements of CEO compensation. We found no evidence that captured directors led to greater levels of, or changes in, CEO compensation. These findings may suggest the consideration of theories other than agency theory as explanations for the continued focus on board independence.