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作者：Kaplan, Steven N.; Sensoy, Berk A.; Stromberg, Per
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Southern California
摘要：We study how firm characteristics evolve from early business plan to initial public offering (IPO) to public company for 50 venture capital (VC)-financed companies. Firm business lines remain remarkably stable while management turnover is substantial. Management turnover is positively related to alienable asset formation. We obtain similar results using all 2004 IPOs, suggesting that our main results are not specific to VC-backed firms or the time period. The results suggest that, at the margi...
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作者：Chhaochharia, Vidhi; Grinstein, Yaniv
作者单位：University of Miami; Cornell University
摘要：In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying industry effects, size, and performance. The decrease in compensation is particularly pronounced in the subset of affected firms with no outside blo...
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作者：Cronqvist, Henrik; Heyman, Fredrik; Nilsson, Mattias; Svaleryd, Helena; Vlachos, Jonas
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict-inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy p...
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作者：Brown, James R.; Fazzari, Steven M.; Petersen, Bruce C.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Montana State University System; Montana State University Bozeman
摘要：The financing of R&D provides a potentially important channel to link finance and economic growth, but there is no direct evidence that financial effects are large enough to impact aggregate R&D. U.S. firms finance R&D from volatile sources: cash flow and stock issues. We estimate dynamic R&D models for high-tech firms and find significant effects of cash flow and external equity for young, but not mature, firms. The financial coefficients for young firms are large enough that finance supply s...
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作者：Babenko, Ilona
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：I show that share repurchases increase pay-performance sensitivity of employee compensation and lead to greater employee effort and higher stock prices. Consistent with the model, I find that after repurchases, employees and managers receive fewer stock option and equity grants, and that the market reacts favorably to repurchase announcements when employees have many unvested stock options. Managers are more likely to initiate share repurchases when employees hold a large stake in the firm. Mo...
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作者：Li, Haitao; Wang, Junbo; Wu, Chunchi; He, Yan
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; City University of Hong Kong; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; Singapore Management University; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; Indiana University System; Indiana University Southeast
摘要：We provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of liquidity and information risks on expected returns of Treasury bonds. We focus on the systematic liquidity risk of Pastor and Stambaugh as opposed to the traditional microstructure-based measures of liquidity. Information risk is measured by the probability of information-based trading (PIN). We document a strong positive relation between expected Treasury returns and liquidity and information risks, controlling for the effects o...
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作者：Kutsuna, Kenji; Smith, Janet Kiholm; Smith, Richard L.
作者单位：Kobe University; Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College; University of California System; University of California Riverside; Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University
摘要：The price formation process of JASDAQ IPOs is more transparent than in the United States. The transparency facilitates analysis of important issues in the IPO literature-why offer prices only partially adjust to public information and adjust more fully to negative information, and why adjustments are related to initial returns. The evidence indicates that early price information conveys the underwriter's commitment to compensate investors for acquiring and/or disclosing information. Offer pric...
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作者：Sarkar, Asani; Schwartz, Robert A.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：We infer motives for trade initiation from market sidedness. We define trading as more two-sided (one-sided) if the correlation between the number of buyer- and seller-initiated trades increases (decreases), and assess changes in sidedness (relative to a control sample) around events that identify trade initiators. Consistent with asymmetric information, trading is more one-sided before merger news. Consistent with belief heterogeneity, trading is more two-sided before earnings and macro annou...
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作者：Atanassov, Julian; Kim, E. Han
作者单位：University of Oregon; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Our results highlight the importance of interaction among management, labor, and investors in shaping corporate governance. We find that strong union laws protect not only workers but also underperforming managers. Weak investor protection combined with strong union laws are conducive to worker-management alliances, wherein poorly performing firms sell assets to prevent large-scale layoffs, garnering worker support to retain management. Asset sales in weak investor protection countries lead to...
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作者：Panageas, Stavros; Westerfield, Mark M.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Southern California
摘要：We study the portfolio choice of hedge fund managers who are compensated by high-water mark contracts. We find that even risk-neutral managers do not place unbounded weights on risky assets, despite option-like contracts. Instead, they place a constant fraction of funds in a mean-variance efficient portfolio and the rest in the riskless asset, acting as would constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) investors. This result is a direct consequence of the in(de)finite horizon of the contract. We sh...
