Labor and Corporate Governance: International Evidence from Restructuring Decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Atanassov, Julian; Kim, E. Han
• 署名单位: University of Oregon; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01436.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 341-374
• 关键词: investor protection; performance; firm

摘要

Our results highlight the importance of interaction among management, labor, and investors in shaping corporate governance. We find that strong union laws protect not only workers but also underperforming managers. Weak investor protection combined with strong union laws are conducive to worker-management alliances, wherein poorly performing firms sell assets to prevent large-scale layoffs, garnering worker support to retain management. Asset sales in weak investor protection countries lead to further deteriorating performance, whereas in strong investor protection countries they improve performance and lead to more layoffs. Strong union laws are less effective in preventing layoffs when financial leverage is high.