CEO Compensation and Board Structure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chhaochharia, Vidhi; Grinstein, Yaniv
• 署名单位: University of Miami; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 231-261
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; determinants; size; DIRECTORS; pay

摘要

In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying industry effects, size, and performance. The decrease in compensation is particularly pronounced in the subset of affected firms with no outside blockholder on the board and in affected firms with low concentration of institutional investors. Our results suggest that the new board requirements affected CEO compensation decisions.