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作者：Roberts, Michael R.; Sufi, Amir
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We show that incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors have a large impact on corporate debt policy. Net debt issuing activity experiences a sharp and persistent decline following debt covenant violations, when creditors use their acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates and reduce the availability of credit. The effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower's alternative sources of finance are costly. In addition, despite the less f...
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作者：Kaplan, Steven N.; Sensoy, Berk A.; Stromberg, Per
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Southern California
摘要：We study how firm characteristics evolve from early business plan to initial public offering (IPO) to public company for 50 venture capital (VC)-financed companies. Firm business lines remain remarkably stable while management turnover is substantial. Management turnover is positively related to alienable asset formation. We obtain similar results using all 2004 IPOs, suggesting that our main results are not specific to VC-backed firms or the time period. The results suggest that, at the margi...
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作者：Axelson, Ulf; Stroemberg, Per; Weisbach, Michael S.
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Private equity funds are important to the economy, yet there is little analysis explaining their financial structure. In our model the financial structure minimizes agency conflicts between fund managers and investors. Relative to financing each deal separately, raising a fund where the manager receives a fraction of aggregate excess returns reduces incentives to make bad investments. Efficiency is further improved by requiring funds to also use deal-by-deal debt financing, which becomes unava...
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作者：Masulis, Ronald W.; Wang, Cong; Xie, Fei
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; George Mason University
摘要：Using a sample of U.S. dual-class companies, we examine how divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights affects managerial extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as this divergence widens, corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside shareholders, CEOs receive higher compensation, managers make shareholder value-destroying acquisitions more often, and capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder value. These findings support the agency hypothesis that ma...
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作者：Garmaise, Mark J.; Moskowitz, Tobias J.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We provide a model of the effects of catastrophic risk on real estate financing and prices and demonstrate that insurance market imperfections can restrict the supply of credit for catastrophe-susceptible properties. Using unique micro-level data, we find that earthquake risk decreased commercial real estate bank loan provision by 22% in California properties in the 1990s, with more severe effects in African-American neighborhoods. We show that the 1994 Northridge earthquake had only a short-t...
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作者：Bollen, Nicolas P. B.; Pool, Veronika K.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We find a significant discontinuity in the pooled distribution of monthly hedge fund returns: The number of small gains far exceeds the number of small losses. The discontinuity is present in live and defunct funds, and funds of all ages, suggesting that it is not caused by database biases. The discontinuity is absent in the 3 months culminating in an audit, suggesting it is not attributable to skillful loss avoidance. The discontinuity disappears when using bimonthly returns, indicating a rev...
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作者：Ljungqvist, Alexander; Malloy, Christopher; Marston, Felicia
作者单位：New York University; Harvard University; University of Virginia
摘要：We document widespread changes to the historical I/B/E/S analyst stock recommendations database. Across seven I/B/E/S downloads, obtained between 2000 and 2007, we find that between 6,580 (1.6%) and 97,582 (21.7%) of matched observations are different from one download to the next. The changes include alterations of recommendations, additions and deletions of records, and removal of analyst names. These changes are nonrandom, clustering by analyst reputation, broker size and status, and recomm...
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作者：Chhaochharia, Vidhi; Grinstein, Yaniv
作者单位：University of Miami; Cornell University
摘要：In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying industry effects, size, and performance. The decrease in compensation is particularly pronounced in the subset of affected firms with no outside blo...
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作者：Bloomfield, Robert J.; Tayler, William B.; Zhou, Flora (Hailan)
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We report the results of three experiments based on the model of Hong and Stein (1999). Consistent with the model, the results show that when informed traders do not observe prices, uninformed traders generate long-term price reversals by engaging in momentum trade. However, when informed traders also observe prices, uninformed traders generate reversals by engaging in contrarian trading. The results suggest that a dominated information set is sufficient to account for the contrarian behavior ...
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作者：Cai, Jie; Garner, Jacqueline L.; Walkling, Ralph A.
作者单位：Drexel University
摘要：Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendations, have little economic impact on shareholder votes-even poorly performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless, fewer votes lead to lower abnormal CEO compensation and a higher probability of removing po...
