Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cronqvist, Henrik; Heyman, Fredrik; Nilsson, Mattias; Svaleryd, Helena; Vlachos, Jonas
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01435.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 309-339
• 关键词: agency costs; corporate governance; capital structure; OWNERSHIP; firm; SHAREHOLDERS; RIGHTS

摘要

Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict-inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with employees. Our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for employee compensation.