2008

最新文章

• EU institutional reform: Evidence on globalization and international cooperation AI翻译
  作者：Baldwin, Richard
• Second-best institutions AI翻译
  作者：Rodrik, Dani
  作者单位：Harvard University
• The economics of climate change AI翻译
  作者：Stern, Nicholas
  作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• Persistence of power, elites, and institutions AI翻译
  作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.
  作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
  摘要：We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political institutions for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power. The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The model provides conditions...
• How high are rates of return to fertilizer? Evidence from field experiments in Kenya AI翻译
  作者：Duflo, Esther; Kremer, Michael; Robinson, Jonathan
  作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• Poverty volatility and macroeconomic quiescence AI翻译
  作者：Jefferson, Philip N.
  作者单位：Swarthmore College
• On the empirical content of quantal response equilibrium AI翻译
  作者：Haile, Philip A.; Hortacsu, Ali; Kosenok, Grigory
  作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; New Economic School
  摘要：The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) notion of Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995) has recently attracted considerable attention, due in part to its widely documented ability to rationalize observed behavior in games played by experimental subjects. However, even with strong a priori restrictions on unobservables, QRE imposes no falsifiable restrictions: it can rationalize any distribution of behavior in any normal form game. After demonstrating this, we discuss several approach...
• When does coordination require centralization? (vol 98, pg 153, 2008) AI翻译
  作者：Alonso, Ricardo; Dessein, Wouter; Matouschek, Niko
  作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Chicago; Northwestern University
• Modeling competition and market equilibrium in insurance:: Empirical issues AI翻译
  作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Salanie, Bernard
  作者单位：Columbia University
• Disasters and recoveries AI翻译
  作者：Gourio, Francois
  作者单位：Boston University