On the empirical content of quantal response equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haile, Philip A.; Hortacsu, Ali; Kosenok, Grigory
• 署名单位: Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; New Economic School
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.180
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 180-200
• 关键词: discrete-choice models; BOUNDED-RATIONALITY; game-theory; BEHAVIOR; differentiation; COORDINATION

摘要

The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) notion of Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995) has recently attracted considerable attention, due in part to its widely documented ability to rationalize observed behavior in games played by experimental subjects. However, even with strong a priori restrictions on unobservables, QRE imposes no falsifiable restrictions: it can rationalize any distribution of behavior in any normal form game. After demonstrating this, we discuss several approaches to testing QRE under additional maintained assumptions.