-
作者:Shimer, Robert
作者单位:University of Chicago
-
作者:Eggertsson, Gauti B.
作者单位:Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要:This paper suggests that the US recovery from the Great Depression was driven by a shift in expectations. This shift was caused by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's policy actions. On the monetary policy side, Roosevelt abolished the gold standard and-even more importantly-announced the explicit objective of inflating the price level to pre-Depression, levels. On the fiscal policy side, Roosevelt expanded real and deficit spending, which made his policy objective credible. These actions vi...
-
作者:Maskin, Eric S.
作者单位:Institute for Advanced Study - USA
-
作者:Ali, S. Nageeb; Goeree, Jacob K.; Kartik, Navin; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位:University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology
-
作者:Cutler, David M.; Finkelstein, Amy; McGarry, Kathleen
作者单位:Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Dartmouth College
-
作者:Fehr, Ernst; Hoff, Karla; Kshetramade, Mayuresh
作者单位:University of Zurich; The World Bank
-
作者:LeBaron, Blake; Tesfatsion, Leigh
作者单位:Brandeis University; Iowa State University
-
作者:Fostel, Ana; Geanakoplos, John
作者单位:George Washington University; Yale University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要:We provide a pricing theory for emerging asset classes, like emerging markets, that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public. We show how leverage cycles can cause contagion, flight to collateral, and issuance rationing in a frequently recurring phase we call the anxious economy. Our model provides an explanation for the volatile access of emerging economies to international financial markets, and,for three stylized facts we identify in emerging markets and high yield d...
-
作者:Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus
作者单位:Stockholm School of Economics
摘要:Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a model in which actors' utility of esteem depends on the audience. In a principal-agent setting, we show that the model can account for motivational crowding out. Control systems and pecuniary incentives erode morale by signaling to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing. The model also offers an explanation for why agents are motivated by unconditionally high pay and by mission-oriented principals.
-
作者:Myerson, Roger B.
作者单位:University of Chicago