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作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
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作者：Waugh, Michael E.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I develop a novel view of the trade frictions between rich and poor countries by arguing that to reconcile bilateral trade volumes and price data within a standard gravity model, the trade frictions between rich and poor countries must be systematically asymmetric, with poor countries facing higher costs to export relative to rich countries. I provide a method to model these asymmetries and demonstrate the merits of my approach relative to alternatives in the trade literature. I then argue tha...
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作者：Mendoza, Enrique G.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Financial crashes were followed by deep recessions in the Sudden Stops of emerging economies. An equilibrium business cycle model with a collateral constraint explains this phenomenon as a result of the amplification and asymmetry that the constraint induces in the responses of macro-aggregates to shocks. Leverage rises during expansions, and when it rises enough it triggers the constraint, causing a Fisherian deflation that reduces credit and the price and quantity of collateral assets. Outpu...
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作者：Mian, Atif; Sufi, Amir; Trebbi, Francesco
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of British Columbia
摘要：We examine the effects of constituents, special interests, and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in US economic history. Representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the Foreclosure Prevention Act, especially in competitive districts. Interestingly, representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Special interests in the form of higher campaign c...
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作者：Grosskopf, Brit; Sarin, Rajiv
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We investigate the impact of reputation in a laboratory experiment. We do so by varying whether the past choices of a long-run player are observable by the short-run players. Our framework allows for reputation to have either a beneficial or a harmful effect on the long-run player. We find that reputation is seldom harmful and its beneficial effects are not as strong as theory suggests. When reputational concerns are at odds with other-regarding preferences, we find the latter overwhelm the fo...
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作者：Ashraf, Nava; Berry, James; Shapiro, Jesse M.
作者单位：Harvard University; Cornell University; University of Chicago
摘要：The controversy over how much to charge for health products in the developing world rests, in part, on whether higher prices can increase use, either by targeting distribution to high-use households (a screening effect), or by stimulating use psychologically through a sunk-cost effect. We develop a methodology for separating these two effects. We implement the methodology in a field experiment in Zambia using door-to-door marketing of a home water purification solution. We find evidence of eco...
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作者：Weizsaecker, Georg
作者单位：Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung
摘要：The paper presents a meta dataset covering 13 experiments on social learning games. It is found that in situations where it is empirically optimal to follow others and contradict one's own information, the players err in the majority of cases, forgoing substantial parts of earnings. The average player contradicts her own signal only if the empirical odds ratio of the own signal being wrong, conditional on all available information, is larger than 2:1, rather than 1:1 as would be implied by rat...
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作者：Ellman, Matthew; Pezanis-Christou, Paul
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg; Universite de Lorraine
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作者：Chakraborty, Archishman; Harbaugh, Rick
作者单位：York University - Canada; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multidimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker. We find that an expert with state-independent preferences can always make credible comparative statements that trade off the expert's incentive to exaggerate on each dimension. Such communication benefits the expert-cheap talk is persuasive-if her preferences are quasiconvex. Communication benefits a decision maker by allowing for a more informed decision, but strat...
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作者：Garcia-Cicco, Javier; Pancrazi, Roberto; Uribe, Martin
作者单位：Central Bank of Chile; Duke University; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
