The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mian, Atif; Sufi, Amir; Trebbi, Francesco
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.1967
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1967-1998
• 关键词: IDEOLOGY; legislators; preferences

摘要

We examine the effects of constituents, special interests, and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in US economic history. Representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the Foreclosure Prevention Act, especially in competitive districts. Interestingly, representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Special interests in the form of higher campaign contributions from the financial industry increase the likelihood of supporting the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. However, ideologically conservative representatives are less responsive to both constituent and special interests. (JEL D72, G21, G28)