Persuasion by Cheap Talk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chakraborty, Archishman; Harbaugh, Rick
• 署名单位: York University - Canada; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2361
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2361-2382
• 关键词: media bias; INFORMATION; COMMUNICATION; auctions; rules; MODEL; news

摘要

We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multidimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker. We find that an expert with state-independent preferences can always make credible comparative statements that trade off the expert's incentive to exaggerate on each dimension. Such communication benefits the expert-cheap talk is persuasive-if her preferences are quasiconvex. Communication benefits a decision maker by allowing for a more informed decision, but strategic interactions between multiple decision makers can reverse this gain. We apply these results to topics including product recommendations, voting, auction disclosure, and advertising. (JEL D44, D72, D82, D83, M37)