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作者：Dal Bo, Pedro; Foster, Andrew; Putterman, Louis
作者单位：Brown University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g., those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of po...
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作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Miniaci, Raffaele; Piovesan, Marco; Ponti, Giovanni
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Brescia; University of Copenhagen; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents choose to work for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agen...
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作者：Ellul, Andrew; Pagano, Marco; Panunzi, Fausto
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Naples Federico II; Bocconi University
摘要：Entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to noncontrolling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,004 firms from 38 countries in 1990-2006, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms but does not affect investment in nonfamily firms. Moreov...
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作者：Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races, among others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these games and apply it to study competitions in which a fraction of each competitor's investment is sunk and the rest is paid only by the winners. Complete-information all-pay auctions ar...
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作者：Herweg, Fabian; Mueller, Daniel; Weinschenk, Philipp
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Bonn; Max Planck Society
摘要：We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic reference point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives. Moreov...
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作者：Eichholtz, Piet; Kok, Nils; Quigley, John M.
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
