Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barone, Guglielmo; Schivardi, Fabiano; Sette, Enrico
• 署名单位: University of Bologna; Luiss Guido Carli University; European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13464
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1963-2016
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; COMMON OWNERSHIP; monetary-policy; credit; MARKET; COORDINATION; collusion; distance; mergers; boards

摘要

We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation that forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 14 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high-quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment, and sales.