Regulatory Fragmentation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kalmenovitz, Joseph; Lowry, Michelle; Volkova, Ekaterina
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Drexel University; University of Melbourne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13423
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1081-1126
• 关键词: revolving-door; labor-market; COMPETITION; PRODUCTIVITY; industries; RISK

摘要

Regulatory fragmentation occurs when multiple federal agencies oversee a single issue. Using the full text of the Federal Register, the government's official daily publication, we provide the first systematic evidence on the extent and costs of regulatory fragmentation. Fragmentation increases the firm's costs while lowering its productivity, profitability, and growth. Moreover, it deters entry into an industry and increases the propensity of small firms to exit. These effects arise from redundancy and, more prominently, from inconsistencies between government agencies. Our results uncover a new source of regulatory burden, and we show that agency costs among regulators contribute to this burden.