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作者：Banerjee, Snehal; Breon-drish, Bradyn; Smith, Kevin
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of California System; University of California San Diego; Stanford University
摘要：We model the feedback effect of a firm's stock price on investment in projects exposed to a systematic risk factor, like climate risk. The stock price reflects information about both the project's cash flows and its discount rate. A cash-flow-maximizing manager treats discount rate fluctuations as noise, but a price-maximizing manager interprets such variation as information about the project's net present value. This difference qualitatively changes how investment behavior varies with the pro...
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作者：Grubb, Michael D.; Kelly, Darragh; Nieboer, Jeroen; Osborne, Matthew; Shaw, Jonathan
作者单位：Boston College; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：At-scale field experiments at major U.K. banks show that automatic enrollment into just-in-time text alerts reduces unarranged overdraft and unpaid item charges 17% to 19% and arranged overdraft charges 4% to 8%, implying annual market-wide savings of 170 pound million to 240 pound million. Incremental benefits from early-warning alerts are statistically insignificant, although economically significant effects are not ruled out. Prior to the experiments, over half of overdrafts could have been...
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作者：Laudenbach, Christine; Siegel, Stephan
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We examine the effect of personal, two-way communication on the payment behavior of delinquent borrowers. Borrowers who speak with a randomly assigned bank agent are significantly more likely to successfully resolve the delinquency relative to borrowers who do not speak with a bank agent. Call characteristics related to the human touch of the call, such as the likeability of the agent's voice, significantly affect payment behavior. Borrowers who speak with a bank agent are also significantly l...
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作者：Hatfield, John william; Kominers, Scott duke; Lowery, Richard
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market pose a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to work with. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which each agent conditions working with other agents on those agents' posted prices. Prices can therefore be meaningfully higher than the competitive level (for a fixed discou...
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作者：Amaral, Francisco; Dohmen, Martin; Kohl, Sebastian; Schularick, Moritz
作者单位：University of Zurich; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Bonn; Free University of Berlin; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：This paper makes the first comprehensive attempt to study within-country heterogeneity of housing returns. We introduce a new city-level data set covering 15 OECD countries over 150 years and show that national housing markets are characterized by systematic spatial variation in housing returns. Total returns in large agglomerations are close to 100 basis points lower per year than in other parts of the same country. Excess returns outside the large cities can be rationalized as compensation f...
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作者：Zhang, Shaojun
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：The pricing of carbon transition risk is central to the debate on climate-aware investments. Emissions are tightly linked to sales and are available to investors only with significant lags. The positive carbon return, or brown-minus-green return differential, documented in previous studies arises from forward-looking firm performance information contained in emissions rather than a risk premium in ex ante expected returns. After accounting for the data release lag, carbon returns turn negative...
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作者：Chen, Alvin
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：The prevalence of pay based on risky firm outcomes for nonexecutive workers presents a puzzling departure from conventional contract theory, which predicts insurance provision by the firm. When workers at the same firm compete against each other for promotions, the optimal contract features pay based on firm outcomes as insurance against promotion risk. The model's predictions are consistent with many observed phenomena, such as performance-based vesting and overvaluation of equity pay by none...
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作者：Biermann, Marcus; Huber, Kilian
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; University of Chicago; University of Chicago
摘要：We show that multinational firms transmit shocks across countries through their internal capital markets. We study a credit supply shock to parent firms in Germany. International affiliates outside Germany supported their parents through internal lending, became financially constrained themselves, and experienced lower real growth. We find that managers were Darwinist with respect to international affiliates but Socialist in the home country, that internal capital markets transmitted the credi...
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作者：Reher, Michael; Valkanov, Rossen
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：All-cash homebuyers account for one-third of U.S. home purchases between 1980 and 2017. We use multiple data sets and research designs to robustly estimate that mortgaged buyers pay an 11% premium over all-cash buyers to compensate home sellers for mortgage transaction frictions. A dynamic, representative-seller model implies only a 3% premium, which would suggest an 8% puzzle. Accounting for heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half of this difference, but a puzzle holds in conditions...
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作者：Davies, Shaun William; Van Wesep, Edward D.; Waters, Brian
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We analyze a setting in which a board must hire a chief executive officer (CEO) after exerting effort to learn about the quality of each candidate. Optimal effort is asymmetric, implying asymmetric likelihoods of each candidate being chosen. If the board has an infinitesimal bias in favor of one candidate, it allocates effort to maximize the likelihood of that candidate being chosen. Even when the board's prior is that its preferred candidate is inferior, she may still be chosen most often. A ...
